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Contractual and organizational characteristics of university-industry research 
collaboration (hereafter UIC) are keys to its success. In this respect, government can 
play essential roles in UIC: Public subsidy for research and development (hereafter 
R&D) is not only an important financial support for UIC, but may also be a useful 
channel to promote trust along with contractual agreements and information sharing 
among the members, which results in effective coordination and thus the success of 
UIC. However, few empirical studies investigate the latter role of public R&D subsidy 
in UIC. Thus, using original survey data, this paper empirically examines and find that 
public R&D subsidy  improves  coordination  in UIC, including trust formation, 
contractual agreements, and communication quality between the partners as well as 
commitment by the partners. 
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University-industry research collaboration (hereafter UIC) has been attracting 
increasing attention both from academia and practice as an effective means of 
promoting research and development (hereafter R&D) and enhancing its productivity 
(Chesbrough, 2003). However, performance of UIC projects varies considerably 
depending on its contractual and organizational characteristics (Mora-Valentin et al., 
2004). Specifically, trust between and commitment by the partners are among the most 
important success factors, because researchers in academia and private firms often 
have considerably different interests, objectives, constraints and incentives, which 
impede an effective organization of UIC (Grilli and Milano, 2009).   
       In  this respect, government can play essential roles in UIC: Public R&D 
subsidy is not only an important financial support for UIC, but also a useful channel to 
promote mutual trust, contractual agreements, information sharing, and commitment in 
UIC, which results in effective coordination and thus the success of UIC.  Public 
subsidy may affect the coordination and organization of UIC projects through direct 
monitoring and evaluation by the government, administrative rules to provide 
contractual safeguard, and the disclosure to the public that disciplines future behavior 
of the recipients. However, compared to the more obvious, direct role of public subsidy, 
on which most previous studies have focused (Spence, 1984; Teece, 1986; David et al., 
2000), its role of improving coordination has rather been ignored in the literature. 
       Several papers refer explicitly to the role of public R&D subsidy to promote 
mutual trust in UIC (Zucker et al., 1994; Das and Teng, 1998, Zucker et al., 2001; 
Darby et al., 2004). To the best of our knowledge, however, few empirical studies have 
investigated such role of public R&D subsidy in UIC. Thus, this paper empirically 
examines if and how public R&D subsidy affects coordination in UIC, including trust 
formation, contractual agreements, and communication quality between the partners as 
well as commitment by the partners, controlling for initial conditions and various 
project characteristics of UIC. In this sense, we will reveal an important role of public 
R&D subsidy that has been hidden thus far in both academic and practical discussion. 
       For the empirical analysis, we use our original survey data on Japanese firms 
in the fields of biotechnology, microelectronics and software that have experienced 
UIC during three years prior to the survey. 55% of our sample firms obtained public 
subsidy for UIC. Two-step GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) is employed for 
empirical estimation in order to control for endogeneity regarding the acceptance of 
public subsidy. Our estimation results indicate that public subsidy in fact has a 3 
 
significantly positive and strong impact on trust formation, contractual agreements, 
communication quality, and commitment in UIC, even after considering endogeneity 
problem.   
       The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
present theoretical backgrounds  of our paper and some hypotheses based on the 
backgrounds. In Section 3, we describe our data and variables used in the empirical 
analysis. In Section 4, we explain our models and estimation method. In Section 5, we 
report our estimation results. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.   
 
2. Backgrounds and hypotheses 
 
UIC has been regarded as an effective R&D strategy to enhance firms’ productivity: an 
effective  way to overcome the lack of internal business resources and enhance 
innovativeness, to achieve economies of scale and scope and synergy effects in R&D, 
to avoid risk and wasteful duplication of efforts, and to increase incentive for R&D 
investment by alleviating  appropriability problem (Katz, 1986; d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin, 1988; Suzumura, 1992; Combs, 1993; Hall et al., 2000)
1
  The performance of UIC essentially depends on its contractual and 
organizational characteristics. Specifically, mutual  trust  and communication quality 
between and commitment by the partners are among the most important success factors 
(Mora-Valentin et al., 2004). Furthermore, Okamuro (2007) indicated  that  the 
contractual characteristics regarding cooperative R&D, specifically the pattern  of 
sharing costs and outcomes, affect the incentives of the partner firms and thus the 
project performance
.   
2
  In this respect, government can play essential roles in UIC
. However, disparities (or high information asymmetries) between 
private firms and universities may cause serious conflicts, misunderstanding, and 
distrust between them, which would make it difficult to efficiently organize a UIC 
project (Grilli and Milano, 2009).   
3
                                                   
1  The theoretical literature analyzing the motivation for firms’ engagement in UIC can be grouped into 
three categories: transaction costs, industrial organization, and strategic management theory (or 
capability theory). See Hagedoorn et al. (2000) and Lechevalier et al. (2007) for more detail. 
. Traditionally, 
2  Aghion and Tirole (1994) provide theoretical foundation with regard to the effect of allocation of 
property rights on both frequency and magnitude of innovations in an incomplete contract framework.   
3  In general, government contributes to open innovation activities in a number of ways (Nakamura, 
2003). For example, government research agencies do their own joint research with firms and 
universities, and they also provide funding to research projects. How these government funds are 
allocated and who gets involved in these research projects may have influence on a nation’s economic 
performance.  Further, government arranges legal settings and launches policies under  which firms 
operate: for example, government usually determines the conditions under which firms are engaged in 
joint R&D projects and the policies for financing R&D investment and for promoting network formation 4 
 
public R&D support is argued to complement private R&D (Spence, 1984; Teece, 
1986). Specifically, David et al. (2000) listed the following mechanisms through which 
public R&D support stimulates complementary private R&D expenditures: (1) R&D 
support generates learning curve effects that enhance the ability of firms to obtain the 
latest scientific and technological knowledge (absorptive capacity). (2) Public funds 
provide the recipients easier access to specific research facilities that would not be 
feasible without public funds, and allow them to start projects with low additional costs 
(cost sharing). (3) Commissioned R&D from the public sector signals future demand 
for technologies, goods, and services diverted to the private sector (pump-priming 
effect)
4
  However, another important channel to stimulate private R&D is the 
promotion of mutual trust among cooperative players (Zucker et al., 1996; Das and 
Teng, 1998; Zucker et al., 2001; Darby et al., 2004). In this paper, we will test if and 
how public R&D subsidy affects contractual and organizational characteristics. Thus, 
in the following discussion, we focus on the relationship between public subsidy and 
coordination mechanisms of UIC. 
. 
       Zucker (1986) defined trust as a set of expectations shared  by all those 
involved in  an exchange.  Das and Teng (1998) also defined trust as positive 
expectations about partner motives. More concretely, they  stress benevolence and 
integrity. Benevolence is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do what is 
good to the trustor. Integrity is the extent to which a trustee is believed to adhere to a 
set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable. In our empirical study, we adopted 
broader definition of trust including benevolence and integrity. 
  Zucker (1986)  further  categorized  trust as three dimensions, namely 
process-based, characteristics-based and institution-based trust. Process-based trust is 
based on concrete experience concerning certain behavioral patterns. It results from the 
dynamics of past and future exchange processes. Each one gathers information on past 
transactions  with which  they can evaluate the other  partner’s trustworthiness. This 
argument is consistent with that of Shapiro et al. (1992) and Doney and Cannon (1997). 
Characteristics-based trust notices the influence of personal bonds, friendship, social 
norms or religion in the relationships among actors. This is similar to the discussions 
                                                                                                                                                     
among actors. 
4  As one of recent empirical studies, Czarnitzki and Ebersberger (2010) find that public R&D subsidy 
results in more R&D spending at the firm level in Finland and Germany. Colombo et al. (2010) examine 
the effect of public R&D support on the investment of new technology-based firms (NTBF) in Italy. 
According to their result, public finance increases the investment rate of small NTBFs, but not of large 
NTBFs. From these analyses, we can infer that public support to NTBFs is helpful, only if it is targeted 
to firms that really need it, such as small and/or young ones. 5 
 
of Sako (1992) and Shapiro et al. (1992). Finally, institution-based trust covers formal 
social structures which are usually supported by sanctions based on the law. These 
include property  rights, business contracts,  and public support.  Institutional 
arrangements provide the rules of the game and the actual play of the game itself 
(Williamson, 2000). 
  Trust is often produced  on institutional mechanisms, including in-group 
preference, formal rules and procedures supported by formal organization or a third 
party with monitoring and enforcement (Brewer and Silver, 1978; Zucker, 1983, 1986, 
1996)
5
  Absent trust in cooperative R&D, participants may take opportunistic action 
such as “cheating, shirking, distorting information, misleading partners, providing 
substandard products/services, and appropriating partners’ critical resources” (Das and 
Teng, 1998, p. 492). To alleviate the loss generated by opportunistic behavior, control 
mechanism is indispensable. 
.  To the  extent that collaborations  within  organization  involve a third party, 
involvement of a third party would help increase the self-enforcing range, and thus 
induce a higher rate of collaboration within organizational boundaries (Zucker, 1996). 
  Control refers to an organizational setup, a process of regulating behaviors, 
and an organizational outcome.  According to Das and Teng (1998), there are two 
important concepts concerning control, i.e. control mechanisms and level of control. 
Control mechanisms  are the organizational  or regulatory  arrangements designed  to 
determine and influence the behavior of organization members, while level of control 
is the degree to which one believes that proper behavior of the other party is ensured. 
Through the establishment of proper control mechanisms, the achievement of desirable 
goals becomes more predictable by deterring opportunistic behaviors in cooperative 
R&D (Provan and Skinner, 1989; Parkhe, 1993). 
       Based on the above discussion, we expect government,  providing public 
subsidy, to play an important role as a third party in government-sponsored UIC, and to 
promote trust among participants.  In sum, the following implicit institutional or 
administrative  designs are expected to promote  effective coordination  among  UIC 
participants:  (1) a third party (government) regularly  monitors and evaluates 
participants'  behavior in UIC to ensure cooperation, (2) a third party provides 
administrative structures and regulatory agreements as contractual safeguards in UIC 
                                                   
5  Anthropologists (e.g. Geertz, 1978) state that a combination of repeated exchange and expected future 
exchange produce trust, when a third party is not available to monitor the exchange. As indicated by 
Mayer et al. (1995) and Kopczak and Johnson (2007), trust develops over time. Trustors learn about the 
trustworthiness of the  trustee, based on the trustee’s actions in situations of risk and vulnerability, 
through accumulated experience. 6 
 
to increase confidence in successful coordination, and (3) a third party (government) 
sets up control mechanisms to influence the future behaviors of organization members. 
The outcomes and the processes of government-sponsored UIC will be reported in 
public, which would deter opportunistic behaviors by UIC participants. It is plausible 
that the participants, who desire to receive another public fund in the future, are not 
likely to engage in opportunistic behaviors. Moreover, in preparing for the application 
for a public subsidy, project members should intensely communicate each other, which 
may promote further communication and trust formation.   
       An example of the public R&D subsidy provided by METI (Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry) may illustrate government’s role to improve 
coordination process in UIC. METI’s  “Consortium R&D Project for Regional 
Revitalization”  starting in 1997 is one of the major support  programs  for UIC 
projects
6
       This program is carried out as R&D projects contracted by METI to 
competitively selected research consortia, so that R&D expenditures for the projects 
are fully covered by the subsidy. The subsidy is paid for the contracted work, thus not 
at the beginning of, but after finishing the project work. Each consortium has  a 
management organization
.   
7
       Upon acceptance, management organizations  of selected consortia have to 
conclude formal contracts with regional departments of METI to conduct the projects. 
Management organizations usually  conclude then subcontracting agreements with 
project members. Project members are also requested to provide collective 
confirmation for the commercialization of research outcomes.   
  that prepares for and submits application form (project 
proposal).  Proposals  should include detailed description  of research plan and 
commercialization plan,  project  schedule, budget plan, detailed information  on 
management organization, project leader and sub-leader as well as each of other 
members (firms, university professors, etc.), and each member’s role in the project.   
       After finishing the project (basically  within two years), management 
organization submits the project report to METI, which then reimburses the R&D 
expenditures of the project. Project evaluation by METI is conducted based on the final 
report from the management organization. In the final report and evaluation, not only 
the technological achievement of the project, but also the efficiency of project 
coordination and the effort for improving it should be taken into consideration. METI 
publishes information about the selected consortia including membership and the final 
                                                   
6   Following information on this support program was obtained from the website of METI 
(http://www.meti.go.jp/). 
7  Management organization can be a private firm, university, public research institute, or public agency. 7 
 
reports  of these projects. Moreover, METI follows up further research and 
commercialization of project outcomes by the supported consortia for five years after 
finishing the project.   
       In this way, METI and its regional departments monitors and evaluates UIC 
projects, enforces clear mutual agreements also among the members, and make project 
information public. We expect such institutional background to encourage better 
coordination in the UIC projects.   
  Thus, through the social relations backed by government, collaborators in UIC 
can  be able to relax their boundaries and extend their network for R&D
8
 
.  In this 
circumstance, close contacts  among researchers in cooperative  R&D  facilitate  the 
transmission of novel knowledge which is often tacit in nature (Zucker et al. 1998). 
Further,  relaxation of boundaries around the  participants  allows more information 
exchange and learning across organizational boundaries than would otherwise be the 
case (Zucker et al. 1996). Therefore, we provide following four hypotheses with regard 
to public R&D subsidy and contractual and organizational characteristics. 
H1 Public R&D subsidy promotes a mutually agreeable explicit contract between a 
firm and a university in a UIC project. 
H2 Public R&D subsidy enhances quality of communication between a firm and a 
university in a UIC project. 
H3 Public R&D subsidy strengthens firms' commitment to a UIC project. 
H4 Public R&D subsidy supports trust formation between a firm and a university in a 
UIC project.   
 
       Most empirical studies examine the effect of participation in public R&D 
support on firm performance, e.g. patent productivity (Zucker et al., 1996; Branstetter 
and Sakakibara, 2002; Das and Teng, 1998; Zucker et al., 2001; Czarnitzki and 
Hussinger, 2004; Hujer and Radic, 2005; Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Darby et al., 2004; 
Hussinger, 2008; Grilli and Milano, 2009; Lechevalier et al., 2010).  Further,  most 
literature is based  on case studies: SEMATECH in the US semiconductor industry 
(Irwin and Klenow, 1996; Link et al., 1996); the VLSI Cooperative R&D Association 
in Japan (Sakakibara, 1981; Otaki, 1983); the Fifth Generation Computer Project in 
Japan (Odagiri et al., 1997); the Next Generation Projects such as the Exploratory 
Research for Advanced Technology (ERATO) in Japan (Hayashi, 2003); the Advanced 
                                                   
8  Darby et al. (2004) support this referring to the case study of Advanced Technology Program (ATP) by 
U.S. Department of Commerce. 8 
 
Technology Program (ATP) in the US (Jaffe, 1998; Link, 1998; Hagedoorn et al., 2000; 
Hall et al., 2001); the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) in the US (Lerner, 
1999; Wallsten, 2000); the Alvey Programme for Advanced Information Technology in 
the UK (Quintas and Guy, 1995); the Societa di Ricerca in Italy (Tripsas et al., 1995); 
the Office of the Chief Scientist Program (OCS) in Israel (Lach, 2002; Trajtenberg, 
2002); the EUREKA and EU Framework Programmes (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 
2002) and the SESI-TSER Project (Carayol, 2003) in Europe.   
  They largely find positive effect of public R&D support on firm performance, 
but  few  of them empirically show why public R&D support enhances firm 
performance, possibly due to data constraints. To the best of our knowledge, little has 
been done  regarding the effect of public R&D subsidy on contractual and 
organizational characteristics in R&D cooperation, whereas several theoretical studies 
suggest positive links between them. Therefore, a major contribution of this paper is to 
empirically examine if and how public R&D subsidy affects coordination mechanism 
in UIC. Thus, our findings would enable us to deepen our understanding on the success 
factors of UIC. 
 
3. Data and variables 
 
This section explains our data source and variable construction. First, we describe our 
original survey conducted in 2008 as the data source. Then, we present our dependent 
and independent variables. 
 
3.1. Data 
The empirical analyses are based on original survey data. We conducted a postal 
survey in 2008 for 9,882 firms in the fields of biotechnology, microelectronics, and 
software.  We selected these three technology fields as representing major 
science-based industries in which UIC is especially important (Meyer-Krahmer and 
Schmoch, 1998). Our sample firms  were extracted from the company database of 
Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR) and the directory of the Japan Bioindustry Association 
(JBA). In this survey, UIC was defined as project-based R&D collaboration between 
universities and companies aiming at the generation of new technologies, products, or 
processes. We obtained 1,732 responses, among which 277 firms have finished UIC 
during the preceding three years. These 277 firms comprise our sample for empirical 
analysis. 155 out of these 277 projects (55%) received public R&D subsidy for the 9 
 
UIC project
9. Among the projects with public R&D subsidy, its average ratio to total 
project budget was 45%
10
  The questionnaire asked  about  the  characteristics  of UIC  projects and 
participating firms. The respondents are asked to provide information on the latest 
project if they engaged in more than one projects and on the relationship with the most 




        Project characteristics comprise  coordination  mechanisms  in UIC, such as 
trust formation, contractual agreements, and communication quality between the 
partners as well as commitment by the partners. Moreover, we collected the data on the 
ratio of public subsidy to total UIC budget, initial conditions of UIC (tie strength, 
technological relatedness, geographical distance  between the partners, and research 
capability of the partner) and other aspects (the importance of public administration in 
finding the partner university, the university's intellectual property policy, market and 
technology unpredictability surrounding the UIC, the number of participants, project 
duration,  and  technological orientation). Firm characteristics include size,  R&D 
intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales), and technological field. We used 
these information to construct our dependent, independent, and instrumental variables. 




In this section, we explain the dependent and independent variables in our estimation 
model. All variables are derived from our survey. The concrete items of the survey 
used in this paper are shown in Appendix 1.   
 
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
We use the following four dependent  variables measured as  firm’s  subjective 
evaluations  on 7-point Likert scales:  (1) contractual  safeguards  (contract), (2) 
communication quality (communication), (3) the strength of firms' commitment in UIC 
(commitment), and (4) trust formation (trust). We create the variable contract as the 
                                                   
9  The firms (projects) that did not obtain public subsidy comprise both the firms (projects) that did not 
applied for public subsidy and those whose applications were rejected. From our questionnaire, we 
cannot distinguish between these groups. However, this would not incur severe empirical problems 
because we control for the endogeneity of obtaining public subsidy in the empirical estimation.   
10  No further information was available about public subsidy including its rules, targets, or processes. 
11  40% of the projects in our sample include two or more universities. Therefore, by focusing on the 
most important university partner, we cannot exclude the possibility of upward bias for these projects, 
although we control for the number of project members and the (subjective evaluation of) research 
capability of the university partner in the empirical analysis,   10 
 
average value of the strength of contractual safeguards in UIC regarding 1) partner’s 
roles and responsibility, 2) partner’s obligation for performance, 3) project schedules, 
4) project budgets, 5) data protection and secrecy, 6) profit sharing, 7) legal procedures 
in troubles, and 8)  the procedures in case of unpredicted events
12
 
.  The variable 
communication  is  measured as the  average value of four items regarding 
communication quality comprising  timely,  accurate,  adequate, and  complete 
information exchange  between the partners.  The variable commitment  denotes  the 
strength of firms' commitment to the university partner measured as the mean value of 
four items regarding the engagement of a key person in the firm in promoting UIC 
internally and in the relationship with the university partner. Finally, we construct the 
variable trust from the perceptions about the partner’s benevolence and integrity. 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
We are most concerned about how public R&D subsidy affects coordination in UIC. 
We provide two measures of public subsidy. The one is the dummy variable d_subsidy 
which takes on the value one if the UIC project received public funds. The other is 
subsidy which is measured as the ratio of public subsidy to total UIC budget. If public 
subsidy  promotes  contractual agreement, communication, commitment and mutual 
trust among cooperative partners, the coefficient of d_subsidy  is expected to be 
positive. We use subsidy for robustness check. Okada and Kushi (2004) indicate that 
the investment ratio by government is positively associated with higher evaluation of 
the research results of the government-sponsored cooperative research. According to 
them, the ratio of public subsidy to project budget (subsidy) can be regarded as the 
degree of commitment by government. We expect that higher commitment  by 
government lead to stronger monitoring and evaluation of participants’ behavior in 
UIC for ensuring cooperation. 
Public subsidy 
 
Initial conditions of a UIC project would be also important factors affecting contractual 
and organizational characteristics of the UIC. We use four types of ex ante relationship 
factors that are determined prior to the UIC: (1) tie strength measuring the closeness of 
the relationship between the  firm and the  university  partner  (tiestrength),  (2)  the 
technological relatedness between the firm and the university partner (tech_relate), (3) 
Initial conditions 
                                                   
12  Using these items, we measure the level of mutual understanding and explicitness of contractual 
agreements. 11 
 
firms' evaluation of the research capability of a partner university (capability), and (4) 
geographical  distance to the university  partner (distance). The variables except for 
distance are measured on 7-point Likert scales, while distance is a categorical variable.   
       Closeness of the relationship, technological relatedness between the firm and 
the university partner, and the partner's research capability would promote coordination 
in UIC (Mora-Valentin et al., 2004). Past experience of cooperation and the higher 
evaluation of a partner's capability smooth the coordination in research cooperation 
through process-based and characteristics-based trust (Zucker et al., 1986). However, 
the effect of distance on contractual and organizational characteristics is ambiguous. 
Geographical closeness to a partner promote face-to-face communication and improve 
coordination among UIC participants (Malmberg et al. 1996; Fujita, 2007), whereas 
geographical  distance may be associated with stronger monitoring of behavior and 
performance  and  higher  communication frequency to smooth collaboration among 
research partners. Thus, the effect of geographical distance on coordination remains an 
empirical issue.   
 
The survey collected further  information on the  partner university's  intellectual 
property (IP) policy, market and technology uncertainty surrounding the UIC project, 
the number of project participants, project duration, and technological orientation of 
the project. 
Other project characteristics 
  Among these project characteristics, we pay special attention to the IP policy 
of the partner university, considering the recent emergence and development of IP 
policy at Japanese universities
13
  We control for market and technology unpredictability surrounding the UIC 
project using the variables unpre_mkt  and  unpre_tech  measured by 7-point Likert 
scales.  The less predictable the market and technological circumstances, the more 
efforts of coordination would be necessary, because such unpredictability may give rise 
to opportunistic behavior of the partners (Williamson, 1975)   
. We measure the firm’s evaluation of the partner 
university's IP policy with regard to clearness, equitability, and the flexibility to the 
needs of partners using 7-point Likert scales and construct the variable univ_ip by 
calculating the average value of those items. We expect that the variable univ_ip be 
positively correlated  with  dependent variables because reasonable university's IP 
policy is likely to smooth coordination with the UIC project 
                                                   
13  The Japanese government enacted the Technology Licensing Organization (TLO) Act in 1998 and the 
Japanese Bayh-Dole Act in 1999 to promote UIC. These policy changes facilitated the Japanese firms to 
contract collaborative research with universities (Okada et al. 2009).   12 
 
       Moreover, we include the total number of UIC participants (num_par) in our 
model. We may expect that a large number of participants induce high coordination 
costs. In addition to project duration (proyr), measured by the number of months in 
natural logarithm, the technological orientation of the UIC (basic research, applied 
research, or development) may also be related with the contractual and organizational 
characteristics. Thus, we create dummy variables of technological orientation in these 
three categories (basic research, applied research, and development), among which the 
last one is regarded as the baseline reference.   
 
4. Empirical method 
 
4.1. Model 
We  employ  two-step GMM estimation  to analyze how public subsidy affects 
contractual and organizational characteristics of  UIC  projects, using the  variables 
defined in the previous section
14
 
. The empirical specification is described as follows. 
  Yi = d_subsidyi + tiestrengthi + tech_relatei + distancei + capabilityi 
      + univ_ipi + unpre_mkti + unpre_techi + num_pari + log(proyr)i 
      + basic researchi + applied researchi + ei 
 
where subscript i denotes UIC project and ei is error term. Yi is the dependent variable 
for which we use contract, communication, commitment, and trust interchangeably. 
Our main concern is the effect of public subsidy (d_subsidy). However, we assume that 
obtaining public R&D subsidy be endogenously determined
15
                                                   
14  Later we check the robustness of our estimation by redefining or reconstructing the dependent 
variables and using SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) considering positive correlations among the 
dependent variables.   
. For example, smaller 
and more R&D intensive firms may be more likely to receive public funds than larger 
and less R&D intensive ones. Further, research projects with higher quality are more 
likely to receive public funds, because most public funds are provided to selected 
applicants through competitive schemes. Unfortunately, however, we cannot obtain the 
information on ex ante evaluation of UIC projects from our survey, whereas we have 
information on the characteristics of its participants. Therefore, in order to cope with 
this endogeneity problem, we use some instruments on firm characteristics that would 
not directly affect coordination in UIC.   
15  We conducted Wu-Hausman test with regard to the endogeneity of public subsidy. The result shows 





Our instruments for receiving public subsidy consist of some basic characteristics of 
firms and the means to search for the university partner. 
 
We use the number of employees (emp), the R&D ratio to sales (rd_ratio) and the 
dummies of firms' technology fields as instruments. The number of employees (emp) is 
a measure of firm size. The R&D ratio to sales is regarded as a measure of firms’ R&D 
capability or absorptive capacity. We expect that R&D intensive firms are more likely 
to receive public funds than others, while smaller firm eagerly apply for public funds 
because of their limited R&D resources. Finally, dummy variables of technology fields, 
i.e. biotechnology, microelectronics, and software, are included in the model to control 
for  the differences in appropriability innovation outcomes and technological 
opportunities.   
Basic characteristics of firms 
 
How a firm found its university partner may also be an important factor for receiving 
public subsidy.  Specifically,  we expect that UIC developed through public 
administration (search) be most closely related to the acceptance of public subsidy. 
The variable search denotes the importance of public administration in finding the 
university partner measured by 7-point Likert scale. 
The means to search for the university partner 
 
       We summarize the  basic statistics of the dependent,  independent, and 
instrumental variables  in  Table 1  comparing the firms (projects) with and without 
public R&D subsidy. We also provide the results of significance test on the difference 
of mean values.   
       With regard to the entire sample, the degree of contractual agreements, 
communication, commitment and trust are all relatively highly evaluated with the 
mean points ranging between 4.9 and 5.6. The sub-group with R&D subsidy has higher 
mean values of these dependent variables than the other sub-group. Mean values of 
contract and commitment are significantly different at the 5 % level. 55% of sample 
firms (or UIC projects) received public R&D subsidy, while its ratio to total project 
budget is 45% on average of the recipients. UIC projects in our sample consist of 4.6 
members on average with a mean duration of 34 months. We confirm no significant 
differences in the mean values of project characteristics at the 5 % level. With regard to 14 
 
firm and industry characteristics used as instruments, we observe that the firms that 
obtain public subsidy are significantly smaller and more R&D intensive than the others, 
while biotechnology firms are more likely to obtain R&D subsidy than those in the 
other technological fields.   
 
5. Estimation results 
 
In this section, we present the estimation results regarding four dependent variables:   
contract,  communication,  commitment, and  trust.  Table 2  shows the results  of  the 
second stage of the two-step GMM estimations. We include in the model all 
independent variables mentioned  above,  except for subsidy.  Instead of the ratio of 
public subsidy to total budget of UIC project, we use the dummy variable d_subsidy, to 
test the effect of receiving  public subsidy on contractual and organizational 
characteristics in UIC.   
  Before discussing the effects  of independent variables, we mention the 
validity of instruments regarding the utilization of public subsidy (d_subsidy). We find 
that partial R squares are relatively high ranging from 0.194 to 0.203. The values of 
partial F statistics are higher than 7, but lower than 10. Therefore, we cannot reject the 
weak instrument problem regarding d_subsidy, although F-test of excluded instruments 
in all models reject the null hypothesis that the set of identifying instruments are weak. 
Hansen J test statistically supports no correlation between the instruments and the error 
term of the equation in the second stage.   
  First of all, the availability of public subsidy (d_subsidy) has a strong and 
positive impact on contractual safeguards (contract), communication quality 
(communication), firms' commitment (commitment), and trust formation (trust) in UIC. 
These results suggest that,  as  expected,  public R&D subsidy  encourages mutually 
agreeable contracts, information sharing, and trust formation among the participants as 
well as firms' commitment in the UIC through implicit institutional designs. Following 
our results, we  can calculate that  the UIC receiving public subsidy, on average, 
enhances 0.959 point in contractual safeguards, 0.867 point in communication quality, 
1.502 point in firms' commitment, and 0.911 point in trust formation in UIC on 7-point 
scales. 
  Second, we find that several initial conditions are important factors to 
effective coordination in UIC. The coefficients of closeness of the relationship between 
the partners prior to the UIC (tiestrength) are positive and significant at the 1% or 5% 
level with regard to contractual safeguards (contract) and trust formation (trust) in UIC. 15 
 
Further, the coefficient of technological relatedness between the firm and the university 
(tech_relate)  is  positive and significant at the 1% level regarding  contractual 
safeguards (contract). The coefficient of research capability of the partner university 
(capability) is positive and significant at the 1% level regarding communication quality 
(communication). These are partly consistent with our expectation that favorable initial 
conditions prior to the UIC promote ex post coordination in the UIC. Different from 
tiestrength,  tech_relate  and  capability,  geographical  distance  (distance) does not 
significantly  affect contractual and organizational characteristics. As already 
mentioned, geographical distance has possibly the two opposite effects which may get 
the impact of distance less apparent. 
  Third, if we look at the coefficients of other project characteristics, we find 
that the partner university's IP policy is the most effective and important factor to 
promote coordination in UIC. The coefficients of the university's IP policy (univ_ip) 
are positive and significant at the 1% level in all models. Therefore, the university's IP 
policy with regard to clearness, equitability, and the flexibility to the partners’ needs 
contributes to desirable  ex post coordination in UIC. Regarding the market and 
technology uncertainty surrounding the UIC, unpre_mkt has a positive but weak effect 
on contractual safeguards (contract). It is plausible that high level of market 
uncertainty surrounding the UIC induces its participants to mutually agreeable explicit 
contracts
16
  Table 3 presents the estimation results for robustness check, using the ratio of 
public subsidy to total UIC budgets (subsidy) which would reflect the degree of 
commitment by government. The other independent variables are same as in Table 2. 
In this estimation, we again find that public subsidy has a strongly positive effect on 
contractual safeguards (contract), communication quality (communication),  firms' 
commitment (commitment) and trust formation (trust) in the UIC. Our results suggest 
that a 10% increase in the ratio of public subsidy to total UIC budgets, on average, 
leads to 0.16  point  increase  in  contractual safeguards, 0.20  point  increase  in 
communication quality, 0.23 point increase in firms' commitment, and 0.13  point 
increase in trust formation in UIC on 7-point scales. 
. 
       The dependent variables of our model may be positively or negatively 
                                                   
16  As robustness checks, we further included in the model the variables of the importance (weight) of 
the UIC project in focus for the entire innovation strategy of firms and of the UIC experience in general 
(not with a particular university partner) that are both based on subjective evaluations measured by 
7-point Likert scales. We found that the effect of public subsidy does not considerably change after 
including these variables, while the former variable has positive and significant effects on contract, 
communication and commitment, but the latter does not significantly affect project coordination. These 
additional results are available upon request from the authors.   16 
 
associated each other according to the complimentary or substitutive relationship. 
Indeed, correlation coefficients among them (0.33–0.60)  suggest the former, 
complementary relationship allover. Thus, we also conduct SUR (Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression) considering correlation among the error terms of the estimation models of 
these dependent variables. Table 4 presents the estimation results of SUR that are 
similar to those in Table 2. Therefore, we may conclude that our empirical findings are 
robust even considering for complementary relationship among the dependent 
variables.   
  Finally, we conduct estimations using each discrete item of the questionnaire 
as dependent variables (without constructing them from aggregation). The results are 
summarized in Table 5. To save space in the paper, we do not mention all the results in 
detail. However, even if we use each item as the dependent variable, we can conclude 
that whether a UIC project receives public subsidy or not is a key determinant of the ex 
post contractual and organizational characteristics in the UIC
17
 
.   
6. Conclusion 
 
UIC has been increasingly regarded as an effective means to promote private R&D and 
to enhance its productivity, but the performance of UIC project depends essentially on 
its contractual and organizational characteristics. In this respect, government can play 
essential roles: Public R&D subsidy is not only an important financial support for UIC, 
but  may  also  be  a useful means  to promote mutual trust, contractual agreements, 
information sharing, and commitment in UIC, which results in effective coordination 
and thus the success of UIC. However, despite several conceptual arguments on the 
latter role of public subsidy, few empirical studies have directly investigated it thus far. 
       Using original survey data on Japanese firms in the fields of biotechnology, 
microelectronics and software, this paper empirically examined if public R&D subsidy 
contributes to improving coordination in UIC. This is a major contribution of this paper. 
The estimation results by two-step GMM procedure show that public R&D subsidy has 
indeed  a significantly positive and strong impact on trust formation, contractual 
characteristics, communication quality, and commitment  in UIC even when 
considering endogeneity. That is, public R&D subsidy encourages mutually agreeable 
explicit contracts, information sharing, and trust relationship among the participants as 
well as firms' commitment in UIC. Our results also indicate that initial conditions of 
                                                   
17  As another robustness check, we construct the variables contract, communication and trust from 
principal component analysis for the same regressions as Tables 2 and 3 and obtained very similar 
results. Further information on this additional analysis is available from the authors upon request.   17 
 
UIC and IP policy of partner universities are particularly associated with contractual 
and organizational characteristics.   
       Our analysis has some restrictions that are mostly ascribed to data constraints 
and that should be extended or improved in future research. First, we measured the 
dependent variables on contractual and organizational characteristics of UIC by 
retrospective and subjective evaluations of managers. Future research should provide 
further efforts to check possible measurement bias caused by such evaluations and 
develop more appropriate measurement methods. Second, we have no information on 
the type of public R&D subsidy, i.e. its rules, targets, or processes. Considering 
different characteristics of public subsidies would be a promising research topic. Third, 
we collected data only from private firms. Thus, we have little information on 
university partners and no data of their evaluations of UIC’s contractual and 
organizational characteristics. Further analyses using a matched sample of both sides 
of UIC would be desirable. Fourth, although 40% of the UIC projects in our sample 
include two or more universities and the average number of project members exceeds 
four, we focused on bilateral relationship between a firm and a university, i.e. its most 
important university partner. We expect future research to be extended to consider 
multilateral relationship. Fifth, we used a relatively small sample of Japanese firms, 
focusing on specific technology fields. Thus, it would be important to extend the 
sample to other countries and technology fields in future research to obtain more 
generally applicable findings and implications. Moreover, with regard to analytical 
techniques, the problem of weak instruments should be properly addressed.   
       As a whole, however,  our results empirically reveal an important role of 
public R&D subsidy that has rather been ignored in the literature thus far, and suggest 
the effectiveness of public R&D support as an innovation intermediary. Thus, a major 
implication of this research is that in designing and evaluating public policy, 
specifically with regard to R&D subsidy, we should also consider its indirect effect on 
UIC projects. Previous studies show that contractual and organizational characteristics 
affect the success of UIC. Therefore, we may conclude that R&D subsidy  is an 
effective means to improve coordination, information sharing, and motivation among 




   
                                                   
18  Indeed, in another paper, we estimated the effects of project coordination (contract, communication, 
and commitment) on technological performance of the UIC project  and confirmed positive and 
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Table 1 Basic Statistics (Comparison of firms with and without pubic subsidy) 
 




   
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent var.
　　contract 255 4.85 1.33 136 5.38 1.39 112 4.78 1.25 **
　　communication 254 5.25 1.29 135 5.32 1.19 113 5.14 1.39
　　commitment 256 4.92 1.42 136 5.09 1.42 113 4.72 1.43 **
　　trust 244 5.58 1.25 131 5.70 1.21 107 5.35 1.28 *
Independent var.
　　subsidy 256 24.40 31.80 140 44.62 30.77 － － －
　　tiestrength 213 5.13 1.75 117 5.25 1.78 90 4.97 1.71
　　tech_relate 253 4.10 1.96 135 4.19 2.04 111 3.91 1.83
　　capability 254 5.16 1.63 136 5.15 1.60 112 5.14 1.64
　　distance 255 3.21 1.77 136 3.10 1.87 111 3.34 1.64
　　univ_ip 247 4.93 1.64 132 4.93 1.66 108 4.94 1.60
　　unpre_mkt 253 4.64 1.70 132 4.66 1.69 112 4.55 1.69
　　unpre_tech 252 4.70 1.58 135 4.86 1.53 110 4.53 1.56 *
　　num_par 244 4.62 4.74 131 4.92 4.10 107 4.16 5.32
　　 proyr (month) 250 34.36 21.54 136 36.02 20.86 110 31.33 21.09 *
　　basic research 258 0.20 0.40 139 0.22 0.41 114 0.19 0.39
　　applied research 258 0.41 0.49 139 0.40 0.49 114 0.41 0.49
Instruments
　　emp 237 98.16 143.12 127 74.30 125.20 103 126.17 154.66 ***
　　rd_ratio 236 11.25 21.88 124 13.65 25.42 107 8.17 16.11 **
　　biotechnology 264 0.41 0.49 140 0.47 0.50 116 0.33 0.47 **
　　microelectronics 264 0.29 0.45 140 0.30 0.45 116 0.25 0.43
　　search 251 3.58 1.95 134 3.93 1.98 111 3.13 1.82 ***




Table 2 Estimations Results (GMM) with d_subsidy 
 
Note1: Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.   
2: Robust standard errors are indicated in italics. 
 
 
   
contract communication commitment trust
0.959** 0.867** 1.502*** 0.911***
0.474 0.389 0.585 0.346
0.157*** 0.067 0.019 0.131**
0.061 0.061 0.058 0.056
0.195*** 0.039 0.034 0.029
0.054 0.052 0.071 0.049
0.080 0.210*** 0.067 0.086
0.087 0.076 0.095 0.071
0.005 －0.006 0.104 0.021
0.055 0.054 0.064 0.051
0.211*** 0.318*** 0.299*** 0.279***
0.079 0.064 0.083 0.072
0.123* －0.052 －0.022 0.002
0.074 0.075 0.079 0.078
－0.024 0.016 －0.024 －0.084
0.074 0.076 0.077 0.078
0.006 －0.022 －0.020 0.009
0.029 0.025 0.030 0.023
－0.075 －0.320** 0.027 0.076
0.166 0.145 0.188 0.181
0.170 0.438* 0.041 －0.201
0.281 0.236 0.322 0.279
－0.117 0.139 0.550** 0.071
0.219 0.212 0.251 0.220
1.136* 2.850*** 1.591* 2.820
0.646 0.747 0.814 0.890
sample size 137 136 137 133
Log likelihood －209.226 －199.830 －232.476 －195.617











4.111 6.547 4.693 2.671
















Table 3 Estimation Results (GMM) with subsidy 
 
Note1: Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.   




contract communication commitment trust
0.016* 0.020** 0.023** 0.013**
0.009 0.008 0.011 0.005
0.154** 0.069 0.022 0.127**
0.061 0.068 0.063 0.057
0.201*** 0.040 0.058 0.031
0.056 0.059 0.081 0.049
0.049 0.207** 0.000 0.084
0.081 0.083 0.097 0.067
0.022 0.010 0.102 0.023
0.056 0.060 0.072 0.050
0.239*** 0.344*** 0.355*** 0.288***
0.072 0.070 0.082 0.067
0.131* －0.040 －0.026 0.004
0.077 0.082 0.089 0.080
－0.038 －0.013 －0.030 －0.086
0.075 0.084 0.089 0.080
－0.007 －0.033 －0.029 0.008
0.033 0.030 0.038 0.025
－0.015 －0.217 0.255 0.106
0.155 0.155 0.186 0.169
0.282 0.529** 0.279 －0.182
0.275 0.243 0.336 0.283
－0.223 －0.020 0.438 0.065
0.222 0.251 0.298 0.221
1.026* 2.442*** 1.085 2.689***
0.641 0.849 0.928 0.913
sample size 137 136 137 133
Log likelihood －208.928 －215.410 －243.349 －195.596











4.164 3.443 5.171 2.767
















Table 4 Estimation Results (SUR) 
 
Note1: Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.   
2: Standard errors are indicated in italics. 
 
 
contract communication commitment trust
0.777* 1.008** 1.224** 0.785*
0.455 0.414 0.522 0.427
0.152** 0.093* 0.057 0.136**
0.061 0.056 0.070 0.057
0.200*** 0.024 0.031 0.024
0.058 0.052 0.066 0.054
0.028 0.247*** 0.003 0.143**
0.069 0.063 0.079 0.064
－0.004 －0.005 0.052 0.010
0.056 0.051 0.064 0.052
0.231*** 0.308*** 0.370*** 0.279***
0.065 0.060 0.075 0.061
0.135* －0.025 －0.066 0.030
0.071 0.064 0.081 0.066
－0.037 0.048 0.101 －0.037
0.074 0.067 0.085 0.069
－0.001 －0.012 －0.010 －0.002
0.031 0.028 0.035 0.029
0.182 －0.272* 0.296 0.043
0.173 0.158 0.199 0.163
0.078 0.364 0.094 －0.152
0.27 0.246 0.310 0.253
－0.104 0.100 0.600** －0.038
0.221 0.202 0.254 0.208
0.437 2.157*** 0.406 2.129***
0.757 0.690 0.869 0.711
sample size 130 130 130 130
R-square 0.370 0.435 0.331 0.369















Table 5: Estimation Results on Each Item 
 
Note1: Level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.   
2: Robust standard errors are indicated in italics. 
3: The discrete items of the dependent variables are shown in Appendix 1. 
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3 c4 d1 d2 d3 d4 d5
1.07** 2.074*** 1.649*** 1.267** 0.499 1.407** 1.528* 1.316* 0.795* 0.736 0.993** 1.251*** 1.886*** 1.204* 1.668** 1.293* 0.716* 1.779*** 1.035* 1.127** 0.945**
0.536 0.514 0.566 0.561 0.567 0.644 0.827 0.754 0.425 0.459 0.437 0.428 0.699 0.721 0.809 0.693 0.411 0.480 0.641 0.589 0.435
0.169** 0.173** 0.158** 0.134* 0.199** 0.021 0.298*** 0.258** 0.011 0.107* 0.099 0.100 0.114 －0.064 0.041 －0.017 0.018 0.024 0.115 0.197** 0.147**
0.079 0.084 0.071 0.082 0.087 0.085 0.100 0.106 0.074 0.062 0.071 0.071 0.094 0.09 0.103 0.086 0.060 0.068 0.087 0.091 0.068
0.187** 0.204*** 0.169** 0.239*** 0.164** 0.165* 0.259*** 0.361*** 0.009 －0.010 0.041 0.119* －0.018 0.031 0.057 0.044 －0.024 －0.012 0.009 0.210** 0.070
0.073 0.067 0.067 0.078 0.083 0.094 0.093 0.096 0.059 0.048 0.059 0.063 0.091 0.099 0.118 0.087 0.050 0.057 0.077 0.100 0.065
0.007 0.109 0.034 －0.066 0.059 0.067 0.068 －0.070 0.295*** 0.202** 0.248*** 0.111 0.184 0.045 0.016 0.007 0.174** 0.242*** 0.103 0.141 0.133*
0.085 0.090 0.091 0.100 0.109 0.123 0.130 0.124 0.080 0.082 0.090 0.095 0.13 0.122 0.145 0.107 0.075 0.083 0.098 0.099 0.081
0.134** 0.109 0.080 0.097 －0.016 －0.031 0.037 －0.050 －0.037 0.025 －0.007 0.015 0.095 0.054 0.170* 0.057 0.045 0.04 0.038 0.030 0.020
0.066 0.073 0.071 0.076 0.074 0.078 0.088 0.087 0.061 0.056 0.062 0.060 0.087 0.079 0.097 0.079 0.054 0.067 0.069 0.074 0.060
0.255*** 0.147* 0.136 0.178* 0.205** 0.404*** 0.297*** 0.313*** 0.427*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.221*** 0.433*** 0.252** 0.188 0.374*** 0.351*** 0.115 0.283** 0.209** 0.225***
0.087 0.083 0.096 0.111 0.104 0.109 0.114 0.111 0.075 0.072 0.074 0.073 0.109 0.108 0.133 0.101 0.078 0.085 0.114 0.094 0.081
0.016 0.047 0.051 0.195* 0.173 0.183 0.187 0.134 0.010 －0.059 －0.126 －0.064 0.067 －0.150 －0.190* 0.069 0.046 0.031 0.063 0.083 0.002
0.103 0.091 0.103 0.115 0.109 0.113 0.124 0.118 0.091 0.076 0.081 0.080 0.108 0.105 0.114 0.109 0.081 0.087 0.100 0.112 0.080
－0.110 －0.190* －0.016 0.069 0.010 －0.223** －0.022 －0.009 －0.009 0.096 0.012 －0.017 －0.035 0.116 －0.024 －0.085 －0.176** －0.136 －0.146 －0.245** －0.051
0.090 0.101 0.090 0.109 0.101 0.107 0.112 0.112 0.087 0.070 0.085 0.084 0.113 0.103 0.120 0.106 0.079 0.087 0.099 0.110 0.079
0.053 0.020 －0.052 0.002 －0.044 －0.044 －0.038 0.062 ー0.043 －0.006 －0.035 0.007 －0.083* －0.025 0.066 －0.025 －0.013 0.013 0.001 －0.012 －0.011
0.042 0.035 0.037 0.045 0.053 0.040 0.052 0.041 0.034 0.028 0.026 0.032 0.048 0.042 0.046 0.041 0.027 0.024 0.033 0.036 0.026
－0.366 －0.173 －0.462** －0.252 －0.128 0.461* －0.422 0.051 －0.203 －0.154 －0.450*** －0.452*** 0.053 0.233 0.058 0.007 0.103 －0.133 －0.306 －0.110 －0.112
0.236 0.243 0.224 0.249 0.247 0.253 0.283 0.219 0.179 0.158 0.168 0.161 0.241 0.237 0.275 0.216 0.152 0.194 0.212 0.286 0.163
－0.079 0.258 －0.264 －0.32 0.319 0.286 0.113 0.165 0.196 0.204 0.579** 0.656** －0.239 －0.209 0.125 0.825** －0.267 －0.057 －0.353 0.267 0.152
0.338 0.365 0.386 0.399 0.381 0.419 0.427 0.418 0.302 0.232 0.265 0.260 0.422 0.419 0.488 0.418 0.254 0.298 0.412 0.399 0.319
－0.063 0.095 －0.307 －0.244 －0.510 －0.033 －0.351 －0.228 0.260 －0.011 －0.075 0.277 0.490 0.398 0.711** 0.718** 0.186 －0.003 －0.019 －0.241 －0.118
0.297 0.277 0.314 0.331 0.321 0.288 0.345 0.318 0.239 0.227 0.250 0.243 0.329 0.321 0.346 0.331 0.219 0.257 0.292 0.335 0.236
2.609*** 1.401 3.299*** 2.040** 2.233** －0.678 －0.499 －1.442* 2.056** 2.673*** 3.196*** 3.244*** －0.356 2.005* 1.641 2.282** 2.772*** 3.645*** 3.836*** 1.520 2.964***
0.948 0.959 0.896 0.961 1.047 1.061 0.974 0.784 0.907 0.712 0.838 0.782 0.976 1.043 1.160 1.096 0.850 0.954 1.066 1.046 0.849
sample size 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 133 137 137 136 136 137 137 135 137 133 133 131 131 133


















Appendix 1 Variable constructions - The items in the questionnaire 
Dependent variables 
How clearly were the following issues defined at the beginning of the partnership (1 = 
there was no mutual understanding – 4 = there was a mutual oral understanding – 7 = 
the mutual under-standing was exactly defined in a written document) 
contract 
    (a1) Roles and responsibilities of each partner 
    (a2) Performance obligations of each partner 
    (a3) Project schedules (timing and deadlines) 
    (a4) Project budget (how it should be used and checked?) 
    (a5) Data / secrecy protection, publication of the findings 
    (a6) Profit sharing from new products and processes etc. 
    (a7) Legal procedures in case a partner does not fulfill his role or obligation 
    (a8) Procedures in case of unexpected events 
 
Please evaluate the communication and interaction with the university research partner 
in the partnership (if there were more than one please refer to the most important 
university research partner).   
communication 
Overall, the communication between our firm’s and the university partner’s 
representatives was ... (1-7) 
  (b1) 1 = untimely－7 = timely 
  (b2) 1 = inaccurate－7 = accurate [you can rely on it] 
  (b3) 1 = inadequate－7 = adequate 
  (b4) 1 = incomplete－7 = complete 
 
Please evaluate the role of the person in your company who was most engaged in 
promoting this partnership internally and in the relationship with the university partner. 
commitment 
The person in our company who was most engaged in this partnership… (1=do not 
agree – 7 fully agree) 
  (c1) enthusiastically promoted the UIP advantages within our firm 
  (c2) showed tenacity in overcoming obstacles related to the UIP within the 
    company 
  (c3) did not give up when others said this UIP cannot be done 
  (c4) secured the top level support and financing required for this UIP 29 
 
 
Please evaluate your company’s relationship with your university partner in the UI 
partnership (1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree):   
trust 
  (d1) This university partner’s representatives were frank in dealing with us. 
  (d2) Promises made by the university partner’s representatives were reliable. 
  (d3) If problems (such as delays) arose, the university partner’s representatives   
    were honest about the problems. 
  (d4) The university partner’s representatives made sacrifices for us during the   
    project. 
  (d5) We felt the university partner’s representatives were on our side. 
 
Independent variables 
Please indicate the extent to which your company obtained public subsidies for the UI 
partnership as a percentage of the total budget for this partnership.         % 
Public subsidy 
 
Prior to this UI partnership,  how close was your relationship with this university 
partner? (1=very lose – 7=very close) 
tiestrength 
 
How did your company evaluate the technological relatedness of your university 
partner before you entered into a UI partnership with it (1=fully disagree – 7=fully 
agree)? 
tech_relate 
  This university partner was advancing technology in areas related to our products. 
 
How did your company evaluate the research capability of your partner university 
before you entered into a UI partnership with it? (1=fully disagree – 7=fully agree) 
capability 
  We believed they were scientifically leading in their field 
 
Please indicate the geographical distance between your company and the partner 
university.   
distance 
  (1) Less than 10 km  (2) 10-20 km    (3) 21-50 km 30 
 
  (4) 51-100 km    (5) 101-500 km  (6) more than 500 km 
 
Please evaluate how clearly the partner university's policy on intellectual property 
rights was defined. (1=do not agree – 7 fully agree) 
univ_ip 
  (1) University intellectual property policies were clear and easily understood. 
  (2) University intellectual property policies were sufficiently flexible to meet our   
   firm's needs. 
  (3) University intellectual property policies were equitable in revenue and royalty   
   sharing. 
 
unpre_mkt, 
Please respond regarding the extent of market and technological uncertainties 
surrounding this UI R&D collaboration (1 – 7) 
unpre_tech 
  (1) The market surrounding the research collaboration was very predictable and   
   easy to forecast vs. unpredictable and hard to anticipate.   
  (2) The technological developments surrounding the research collaboration were   




Please rate how relevant the public administration  was  for finding this university 
research partner? (1=not relevant at all – 7=extremely relevant) 
searching for a university partner 
 